Board of directors and profitability ratio of Thai non-life insurers by Pongpitch Petchsakulwong & Naratip Jansakul
ilable at ScienceDirect
Kasetsart Journal of Social Sciences 39 (2018) 122e128Contents lists avaKasetsart Journal of Social Sciences
journal homepage: ht tp: / /www.elsevier .com/locate/k jssBoard of directors and proﬁtability ratio of Thai non-life insurers
Pongpitch Petchsakulwong a, *, Naratip Jansakul b
a Faculty of Commerce and Management, Prince of Songkla University, Trang 92000, Thailand
b Faculty of Science, Prince of Songkla University, Songkhla 90110, Thailandarticle info
Article history:
Received 26 January 2016
Received in revised form 20 February 2017
Accepted 28 February 2017
Available online 7 December 2017
Keywords:
board independence,
board of directors,
proﬁtability ratio,
Thai non-life insurers* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: pongpitch.p@psu.ac.th (P. Petchs
Peer review under responsibility of Kasetsart Univ
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.kjss.2017.11.005
2452-3151/© 2017 Kasetsart University. Publishing
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).ABSTRACT
The aim of this paper was to investigate the impact of board of directors' characteristics on
the proﬁtability ratio of Thai public non-life insurers. A Hausman test was employed on the
selection between ﬁxed and random effects in our panel data for a sample of 208 ﬁrm-
years from 2000 to 2012. Return on total assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and re-
turn on net written premiums (RNP) were used as proxies for the proﬁtability ratio. The
ﬁndings of our analyses revealed positively related and statistically signiﬁcant results
between board size and the proﬁtability ratio. On the contrary, board meeting frequency
was negatively related and statistically signiﬁcant with ROA and RNP. In addition, ﬁrm size
was negatively related and statistically signiﬁcant with the proﬁtability ratio.
© 2017 Kasetsart University. Publishing services by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access
article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/
4.0/).Introduction
The board of directors is a top component of the man-
agement of a ﬁrm for running the business. The board has
important roles in monitoring, controlling, and supervising
the management team to follow the planned policies of its
company. The board is more mentioned nowadays because
it is an important component of corporate governance that
is employed for running the business of a company.
Corporate governance is a good principle of management
because it is a systematic process for managing, supervi-
sion, monitoring, and controlling the management team to
achieve efﬁciency, transparency, fairness, and high re-
sponsibility, and it can be used to investigate the effects of
the credibility and sustainable growth of that ﬁrm.
Corporate governance has been discussed in general
ever since the Thai Financial Crisis in 1997. The Thai gov-
ernment, at that time, found that an important cause of the
ﬁnancial crisis was a lack of strength and insufﬁcient
strictness by the boards of directors in monitoring theirakulwong).
ersity.
services by Elsevier B.V.management teams; as a result, many companies were
shutdown in Thailand. Meanwhile, the attack on the baht's
exchange rate by speculators and foreign investors when it
had never before been devalued resulted in an aggressive
economic crisis in the country and spread to other coun-
tries in Asia and, ultimately resulted in the Asian ﬁnancial
crisis (Gonjanar & Sutthirak, 2012). The Thai government
had to solve this problem by implementing good corporate
governance for managing the business of a company with
an efﬁcient board of directors and strict monitoring of the
management team of the company. The ﬁrst target group to
implement good corporate governance included listed
companies on the Stock Exchange of Thailand.
For insurance companies in Thailand, the Ofﬁce of In-
surance Commission (OIC) has applied a good corporate
governance system to all insurers after the Thai govern-
ment announced that 2002 would be the ﬁrst year of a
good corporate governance campaign in each company.
The objectives were to develop stability, a good monitoring
system, effectiveness in operation, transparency, and
disclosure of information to investors and the general
public. The board of directors, as the representative of
shareholders, is selected and appointed from shareholders
and has a duty to protect the beneﬁts of the ﬁrm, especiallyThis is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
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management team to follow the policies and plans of their
company, as well as reducing agency costs that could
happen in the future.
Generally, the board of directors has important duties in
making decision on the policies and strategies of each ﬁrm,
has the right to select, appoint, and dismiss the manage-
ment team, and has another role in appointing other
committees. Moreover, the board plays other roles in
monitoring the management team, supervising risk man-
agement, and oversight compliances with law, rules, and
regulations. In addition, the board has to promote the
culture of controlling the standard of good practice and
supervise the disclosure of the company's information and
communication with the stakeholders.
Insurance companies in Thailand have to operate their
business under the conditions of OIC, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Public Limited Com-
pany Act B.E. 2535. Under the conditions of OIC, the board
should not comprise less than seven committee members,
and should comprise at least 25 percent independent di-
rectors on the board, and the executive on the board should
be no more than half of all members. A board director must
have educational qualiﬁcations, experience in operations,
or other requirements according to the regulatory agencies'
descriptions. Moreover, the board should meet at least four
times a year. Following the Public Limited Company Act B.E.
2535, the board has to consist of at least ﬁve committee
members. However, the SEC requires the board to have at
least one third independent directors and not less than
three independent directors.
In Thailand, there is little in the literature on the study of
the relation between the board of directors and the return
on the business. Pathan, Skully, and Wickramanayake
(2007) studied the relation of size of the board, indepen-
dent directors on the board, and performance of the banks
in Thailand. They found that a larger board reduced the
performance of a bank. On the contrary, a larger board in-
dependence encouraged a ﬁrm to increase performance.
The study of Yammeesri and Herath (2010) on the charac-
teristics of the board of directors and a ﬁrm's value in
Thailand revealed that changing the number of indepen-
dent directors on the board had no effect on a ﬁrm's value.
One paper investigated the relation between board
characteristics and a life insurance company's performance
in Thailand in 2000e2001 (Connelly & Limpaphayom,
2004). The results indicated that more outside directors
on the board increased proﬁtability. In addition, the larger
the ﬁrm, the greater the proﬁtability. However, the size of
the board had no relation with proﬁtability.
To ensure that good corporate governance under an
efﬁcient board could be implemented in a ﬁrm, we inves-
tigated the impact of the board of directors' characteristics
on the proﬁtability ratio of Thai public non-life insurers
from 2000 to 2012. The board characteristics included the
size of the board, the number of independent directors on
the board, and the frequency of board meetings. This study
differed from that of Connelly and Limpaphayom (2004)
that employed the size of a board and outside directors
on a board as proxies for board characteristics. The proﬁt-
ability ratio is an instrument for evaluating the ability of acompany in receiving income or proﬁt. Return on total as-
sets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and return on net
written premiums (RNP) were used as proxies for the
proﬁtability ratio, which differed from the study of
Connelly and Limpaphayom (2004) as they used ROA, ROE,
ROI, and ROP (Return on Premium) as proxies for the
proﬁtability ratio. A Hausman test was employed in the test
for the selection between ﬁxed and random effects in our
panel data. The results indicated a statistically signiﬁcant
and positive relationship between board size and the
proﬁtability ratio. On the contrary, board meeting fre-
quency was negatively related to ROA and RNP. In addition,
ﬁrm size was negatively related and statistically signiﬁcant
with the proﬁtability ratio.
Our paper contributes to the literature in many ways.
First, this paper contributes to the understanding of
whether the board of directors' characteristics enhanced
the proﬁtability ratio of Thai non-life insurers since the
ﬁnancial crisis in Thailand. Second, this paper is one of the
few studies in Southeast Asia that studied investigated
non-life insurers and the relationship between the board of
directors' characteristics and the proﬁtability ratio. Third,
besides using return on total assets and return on equity as
proxies for the proﬁtability ratio, this paper also utilizes
return on net written premiums as a proxy for the proﬁt-
ability ratio. The return on net written premiums should be
increased when the board performs its duties well and vice
versa.
Theoretical Background and Hypotheses Development
The board of directors, as the representative of the
shareholders of a company, is a top executive position of a
ﬁrm. The board not only makes decisions on strategies but
also determines polices, decides on ﬁnancial objectives, sets
operational budgeting and supervises operations in line
with the plans of the company. Using their expertise and
experience, directors on the board to assist the CEO is a duty
of the board (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Moreover, the board
encourages the management team to follow the strategies
and policies of the company to maximize the beneﬁts to
shareholders as well as to achieve a high proﬁtability ratio.
Strict monitoring of the management team by the board not
only reduces poor management but also increases the
proﬁtability ratio of a company. The proﬁtability ratio is a
tool for measuring the ability of a company to receive in-
come or proﬁt. Many researchers have not employed the
same representatives of the proﬁtability ratio. For example,
Belkhir (2009) used return on total assets, Connelly and
Limpaphayom (2004) and Lin (2011) used return on eq-
uity, and Bauer, Eichholtz, and Kok (2010) used net proﬁt
margin as proxies for the proﬁtability ratio.
The number of directors on the board should effect
efﬁcient monitoring of the management team. Kiel and
Nicholson (2003) suggested that networking and the per-
sonal ability of a member on the board should beneﬁt a
ﬁrm. Huang, Lai, and Wang (2008) indicated that the large
size of the board with more business experience, infor-
mation, and background knowledge could provide better
opinions and options to run the business and solve a ﬁrm's
problems. Beasley (1996) suggested that ﬁnancial fraud
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checking the performance of themanagement team. Jensen
(1993) and Cheng (2008) revealed that it was not easy to
obtain a decision from a large board of directors because
the large board took more time to discuss each idea, thus
reducing the efﬁciency on making decisions. The studies of
Dowen (1995), Belkhir (2009), and Lin (2011) showed that
board size was positively related to return on total assets.
Moreover, Uadiale (2010) found that increasing the number
of board members could increase the return on equity of a
ﬁrm. On the contrary, Guest (2009), Connell and Cramer
(2010), and Rashid, Zoysa, Lodh, and Rudkin (2010) found
that more members on the board decreased return on total
assets. In addition, Dogan and Yildiz (2013) and Pathan
et al. (2007) revealed that board size was negatively asso-
ciated with return on equity. Pathan et al. (2007) indicated
that the smaller board had greater efﬁciency in monitoring
the performance of the management team of a ﬁrm than
did a larger board, thus increasing the proﬁtability ratio.
Therefore, the hypothesis should be developed as follows:
H1: Board size has a relationshipwith the proﬁtability ratio.
The board invites independent directors to oversee the
management of a ﬁrm. Independent directors on the board
are important because they can dedicate themselves to
monitor activities of the management team to protect
against racketeering without pressure from major share-
holders, administration or other relevant parties. Therefore,
they can work freely to provide equitable prevention for
shareholders. Moreover, Jensen (1993) explained that to
build up their reputation the independent directors had to
work hard to investigate the management team. Priebjrivat
and Jiamsagul (2010) found that independent directors had
a statistically signiﬁcant positive relationship with return
on total assets. In addition, Pathan et al. (2007) indicated
that number of independent directors on the board was
positively associated with return on equity. However, Guest
(2009) revealed that independent directors were nega-
tively related to return on total assets. In the same direc-
tion, Shukeri, Shin, and Shaari (2012) found that increasing
the number of independent directors affected a decrease in
return on equity. Collectively, another hypothesis could be
formulated as follows:
H2: Board independence has a relationship with the prof-
itability ratio.
Agency theory indicates that board meeting frequency
can help a ﬁrm to improve the performance of the man-
agement team by frequent overseeing, strict monitoring,
and providing useful advice and appropriate management
from the board. Diligence of the board is not directly
observable, but Ntim and Osei (2011) employed meeting
frequency of a board as a proxy of board diligence. They
found that more meeting time of the board encouraged a
ﬁrm to increase the proﬁtability ratio, and was positively
related and statistically signiﬁcant. Jensen (1993) indicated
that board meeting frequency was an important proxy for
board diligence because it gave an opportunity for theboard to monitor the management team. However, Rebeiz
and Salameh (2006) suggested that the quality of the
meeting time of the board was more important than its
quantity. Jensen (1993) indicated that the cost of board
meetings might increase when a board meeting was not
overseeing the management team, but paying attention to
other tasks. Vafeas (1999) found that board meeting fre-
quency was negatively associated with ﬁrm value. In
addition, Danoshana and Ravivathani (2013) revealed that
the board meeting frequency was negative related to and
statistically signiﬁcant with the proﬁtability ratio, sug-
gesting that the board's longer meeting times increased the
cost of management, decreased the time for managing the
company management team, and decreased the proﬁt-
ability ratio. The proﬁtability ratio decreased because a
member on the board took more time to discuss and make
a conclusion and, thus, a problem was solved slowly.
However, Priebjrivat and Jiamsagul (2010) revealed that
board meeting frequency had no relation with the proﬁt-
ability ratio. Therefore, a hypothesis could be stated as
follows:
H3: Board meeting frequency has a relationship with the
proﬁtability ratio.
Methods
Data Collection
To investigate the relationship between the board of
directors' characteristics and the proﬁtability ratio of Thai
non-life insurers, listed non-life insurance companies,
without one professional reinsurer, in Thailand were
employed as a sample because the board of directors'
characteristics were reported on the Stock Exchanges of
Thailand (SEC) in the Annual Registration Statement (Form
56-1). Moreover, we also received ﬁnancial data from the
Annual Insurance Report of Thailand produced by the Of-
ﬁce of Insurance Commission (OIC). Because of mergers and
consolidations, a few companies were removed. Therefore,
unbalanced panel data of 208 ﬁrm-years made up our ﬁnal
sample over the period 2000e2012.
Data Analysis
To test our hypotheses with the panel data on rela-
tionship between the board of directors' characteristics and
the proﬁtability ratio of non-life insurers, we employed
ﬁxed and random effects. Moreover, the random effects
method did not allow the unobserved effect to be corre-
lated with independent variables, but ﬁxed effects method
did (Wooldridge, 2009). A Hausman test (Hausman, 1978)
was employed for the selection between ﬁxed and random
effects. We tested whether the unobserved effect was
correlated with any independent variables in the model. If
it was, the null hypothesis was random effects. However, if
it was not, the alternative hypothesis was ﬁxed effects.
The following model was used to examine the rela-
tionship of the board of directors' characteristics and the
proﬁtability ratio:
Profitability ratioi;t ¼ aþ b1Lnbdsizei;t þ b2Pbdindi;t þ b3Lnbdmeeti;t þ b4Pbdowni;t þ b5Lnbdcomi;t þ b6Lnbdagei;t
þ b7Lnsizei;t þ b8Firmi þ b9Yeart þ εi;t (1)
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itability ratio is return on total assets (ROA), return on eq-
uity (ROE), and return on net written premiums (RNP).Variables
Dependent Variables
Return on total assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE),
and return on net written premiums (RNP) were proxies
for the proﬁtability ratio. ROA was deﬁned as the square
root of net proﬁt divided by total assets. ROE was deﬁned
as the square root of net proﬁt divided by equity. RNP was
deﬁned as the cube root of net proﬁt divided by net written
premiums.Table 1
Deﬁnition of variables
Variable Deﬁnition
Dependent Variables
Return on total assets
(ROA)
Square root of net proﬁt divided by
total assets
Return on equity (ROE) Square root of net proﬁt divided by
equity
Return on net written
premiums (RNP)
Cube root of net proﬁt divided by
net written premiums
Independent Variables
Board size (Lnbdsize) Natural logarithm of the number of
directors serve on the board
Board independence
(Pbdind)
Proportion of independent
directors serve on the board
Board meeting (Lnbdmeet) Natural logarithm of the number of
board meetings
Board ownership (Pbdown) Proportion of share held by
members serve on the board
Board compensation
(Lnbdcom)
Natural logarithm of total cash
compensation of directors serve on
the board divided by total assets
Board age (Lnbdage) Natural logarithm of the average
age of directors serve on the board
Firm size (Lnsize) Natural logarithm of total assets
divided by one million
Table 2
Descriptive statistics
Variables Mean Median
ROA 0.028 0.029
ROE 0.04 0.61
RNP 0.075 0.050
Board size 12.163 12.000
Proportion of independence board 0.329 0.333
Board independence 3.947 3.000
Board meeting 6.788 6.000
Board ownership 0.122 0.064
Board compensation 3.861 2.360
Board age 59.894 59.871
Firm size 54.129 28.265Board of Director Variables
In this paper, we employed board size, board indepen-
dence, and board diligence to be proxies for the board of
directors' ability. Following Evans, Evans, and Loh (2002),
board size (Lnbdsize) was deﬁned as the natural logarithm
of the number of directors serving on the board. Moreover,
we followed Pathan et al. (2007) to deﬁne board indepen-
dence (Pbdind) as the proportion of independent directors
serving on the board. In addition, following Vafeas (1999)
and Ntim and Osei (2011), board meeting frequency
(Lnbdmeet), a proxy for board diligence, was deﬁned as the
natural logarithm of the number of board meetings.
Firm-speciﬁc Control Variables
Board ownership, board compensation, board age, and
ﬁrm size were included as control variables. Board
ownership was deﬁned as the proportion of share held by
members serving on the board. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1988) indicated that increasing the ownership of the board
reduced conﬂict of interest between a manager and
shareholders. The results of Lin, Huang, and Young (2008)
revealed that board ownership was positively related to
the proﬁtability ratio. However, Uadiale (2010) found that
board ownership was negatively related and statistically
signiﬁcant with the proﬁtability ratio. Therefore, we ex-
pected board ownership to have a relationship with the
proﬁtability ratio.
A higher level of compensation to the board members
should depend on their performance. Thus, enough
compensation to the board encouraged a member to work
harder with increased proﬁtability for the ﬁrm as well as
keeping the board position. Andreas, Rapp, and Wolff
(2012) found that the proﬁtability ratio was positively
related to the level of director compensation. However,
high compensation to the board would reduce efﬁciency of
performance. Li and Qian (2011) revealed that excessive
compensation was negatively associated with the proﬁt-
ability ratio. Board compensation was deﬁned as the nat-
ural logarithm of total cash compensation of directors
serving on the board divided by total assets. Thus, weStandard Deviation Minimum Maximum
0.032 0.108 0.113
0.176 1.579 0.266
0.106 0.263 0.417
2.242 8.000 18.000
0.111 0.176 0.750
1.370 3.000 9.000
3.120 4.000 17.000
0.127 0.000 0.588
3.525 0.313 26.250
4.152 48.600 69.769
86.122 3.647 555.078
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the proﬁtability ratio.
Board age was deﬁned as the natural logarithm of the
average age of directors serving on the board. A member on
the board who was older represented greater experience
and knowledge, and so such a member should make more
discretionary decisions, be more effective in monitoring,
and increase proﬁtability. Letting, Aosa, and Machuki
(2012) showed that board age was positively related to
the proﬁtability ratio. However, discretionary and inactive
decisions due to senility might be a barrier for proﬁtability.
Bonn, Yoshikawa, and Phan (2004) found that board age
was negatively related to the proﬁtability ratio. Therefore,
we expected board age to have a relationship with the
proﬁtability ratio.
Finally, we deﬁned ﬁrm size as the natural logarithm of
total assets divided by one million. Larger ﬁrms had more
credibility, power, and opportunity to access more re-
sources and do business than smaller ﬁrms. Thus, larger
ﬁrms should be able to increase their proﬁtability more
than small ﬁrms. Dogan (2013) and Topak (2011) indicated
that ﬁrm size was positively related and statistically sig-
niﬁcant with the proﬁtability ratio. However, Himmelberg,
Hubbard, and Palia (1999) suggested that larger ﬁrms
might have less efﬁciency in monitoring the management
team because they paid more attention to economy of scale
to reduce the cost than smaller ﬁrms and, thus, caused
lower proﬁtability. Lehmann, Warning, and Weigand
(2004) and Shepherd (1972) revealed that ﬁrm size was
negatively correlated and statistically signiﬁcant with
proﬁtability ratio. Thus, we expected ﬁrm size to have a
relationship with the proﬁtability ratio. We summarized
the deﬁnitions of all variables in Table 1.
Results
Summary Statistics
The descriptive statistics of the variables are shown in
Table 2. Whenwe considered the proﬁtability variables, the
results were not greater than one. The evidence showed
that, on average, return on total assets (ROA) was 0.028. The
average return on equity (ROE) was 0.04, higher than ROA.
No less than ROE, the average return on net written pre-
miums (RNP) was 0.075. Board size varied from 8 to 18
directors, with an average of 12.2 directors. Independent
directors comprised 3.9 members on average, and the
rangewas from 3 to 9members. The average boardmeeting
frequency was 6.8 times each year. Moreover, board
ownership was about 0.12. On average, board compensa-
tion was 3.9. The average age of directors on the board was
59.9 years. Finally, ﬁrm size was 54.1 on average.
Table 3 presents Pearson's pair-wise correlation co-
efﬁcients of proﬁtability and board variables. RNP was
positively correlated with board size. All measures of the
proﬁtability ratio (ROA, ROE, and RNP) were negatively
but not statistically signiﬁcantly correlated with board
independence. Positive, but not statistically signiﬁcant
correlations were presented between two measures of the
proﬁtability ratio (ROA and ROE) and board meeting fre-
quency. All measures of the proﬁtability ratio (ROA, ROE,
Table 4
Regression results of proﬁtability ratio and board of directors
ROA ROE RNP
Constant 0.357 (0.480) 0.689 (0.958) 0.971 (0.994)
Lnbdsize 0.115** (0.049) 0.160* (0.096) 0.272** (0.136)
Pbdind 0.010 (0.082) 0.042 (0.128) 0.021 (0.137)
Lnbdmeet 0.046*** (0.017) 0.019 (0.034) 0.135** (0.058)
Pbdown 0.040 (0.118) 0.162 (0.162) 0.034 (0.146)
Lnbdcom 0.017** (0.008) 0.003 (0.019) 0.009 (0.020)
Lnbdage 0.138 (0.123) 0.275 (0.210) 0.415** (0.211)
Lnsize 0.062*** (0.016) 0.078*** (0.020) 0.114*** (0.029)
Dummy if Year ¼ 2005e2008 0.007 (0.10) 0.008 (0.014) 0.016 (0.019)
Dummy if Year ¼ 2009e2012 0.021 (0.017) 0.043* (0.026) 0.024 (0.035)
Lagrange Multiplier 32.74*** 8.29*** 8.29***
Hausman Test 13.11*** 93.86*** 33.21***
Test results suggest model Fixed Effect Fixed Effect Fixed Effect
Number of Observations 208 208 208
Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percentage levels are indicated by *, **, and *** respectively.
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sation. Board size was negatively correlated with the
number of independent directors. In addition, board size
was negatively correlated with board ownership and
board age. On the contrary, board size was positively
correlated with board compensation and ﬁrm size. Board
independence was negatively correlated with board
ownership. In contrast, board independence was posi-
tively correlated with board age. Board meeting frequency
was negative and statistically signiﬁcantly correlated with
board ownership and board age. However, board meeting
frequency was positive and statistically signiﬁcantly
correlated with board compensation. Board ownership
was negatively correlated with board compensation.
Finally, correlations between ﬁrm size and board charac-
teristics (board size, board independence, board owner-
ship, and board compensation) were positive and
statistically signiﬁcant.
Regression Results
Table 4 presents the regression results of all proﬁtability
measures and board variables. The results showed that
board size was positively and statistically signiﬁcantly
associated with all proﬁtability measures. However, board
independence was positively but not statistically signiﬁ-
cant correlated with all proﬁtability measures. Board
meeting frequency was negatively and statistically signiﬁ-
cantly correlated with ROA and RNP. When we considered
board ownership, the results revealed that it was nega-
tively but not statistically signiﬁcantly correlated with all
measures of the proﬁtability ratio. Board compensationwas
positively related to ROA but not ROE and RNP. Moreover,
board age was positively associated with RNP but not ROA
and ROE. Finally, ﬁrm size was negatively and statistically
signiﬁcantly correlated with all proﬁtability measures.
Discussion
This paper examined the relationship between the
board of directors' characteristics and the proﬁtability ratio
of Thai non-life insurers. The results supported the hy-
pothesis that board size has a relationship with theproﬁtability ratio, and was consistent with Huang et al.
(2008), who suggested that more members on the board
resulted in a greater number of opinions on options for
doing business, based on members' experience, informa-
tion, and background knowledge and, thus, increased the
proﬁtability ratio of a ﬁrm. However, increasing the board
by one extra member did not increase the proﬁtability ratio
bymuch. Board independence has no effect on proﬁtability.
Yammeesri and Herath (2010) explained that independent
directors were appointed following the SET rule and were
responsible for supervising the management team
(Baysinger & Butler, 1985) with not sufﬁcient knowledge of
the company and its data to improve proﬁtability (Koontz,
1967). Consistent with Vafeas (1999) and Danoshana and
Ravivathani (2013), the results indicated that more
meeting times of the board increased the cost of manage-
ment, thus, decreasing the proﬁtability ratio. This sup-
ported the hypothesis that board meeting frequency has a
relationship with the proﬁtability ratio. However, the
number of meetings of the board by one did not decrease
the proﬁtability ratio much. Finally, the results supported
Himmelberg et al. (1999) in that large ﬁrms might have a
lower proﬁtability ratio when the board pays attention to
the economy of scale to reduce the cost of monitoring the
management team.
Conclusions
The results of this study are useful for an insurer in
Thailand to adjust board numbers and meeting frequency.
The empirical results revealed that the proﬁtability ratio is
positively inﬂuenced by board size. Consistent with Huang
et al. (2008), moremembers on the board bring about more
effective information and ideas to add to the proﬁtability
ratio. However, the proﬁtability ratio is negatively inﬂu-
enced by board meeting frequency. This result suggests
that more meeting times of the board decrease the proﬁt-
ability ratio. In addition, the proﬁtability ratio is negatively
inﬂuenced by ﬁrm size. This result is consistent with
Himmelberg et al. (1999) in that large ﬁrms might have a
lower proﬁtability ratio when the board pays attention to
the economy of scale to reduce the cost of monitoring the
management team.
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